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Abstract. Attempts to use schools to assimilate the Huichols into the Revolutionary
nation-state prompted the development of divergent partnerships and conﬂicts in
their patria chica, involving rival Huichol communities and factions, local mestizos,
government oﬃcials and Cristero rebels. The provocations of teachers, the cupidity
of mestizo caciques, rebel violence and Huichol commitment to preserving communal
autonomy undermined alliances between Huichol leaders and federal oﬃcials, and led
to the ultimate failure of the government’s project. If anything, the short-lived
Revolutionary education programme equipped a new generation of Huichol leaders
with the tools to better resist external assimilatory pressures into the s and
beyond.
Keywords: Huichols, Mexican Revolution, state-building, education, Cristero rebel-
lion, assimilation
Between the accession of Álvaro Obregón to Mexico’s presidency in , and
the end of Lázaro Cárdenas’ presidency in , the federal government
sought to politically, culturally and economically ‘incorporate’ the country’s
Indian peoples into the nation-state, predominantly via the eﬀorts of themaes-
tros rurales (rural schoolteachers) of the Secretaría de Educación Pública
(Secretariat of Public Education, SEP). The case of the Huichols of northern
Jalisco (see Map ) – described in the early s by government oﬃcials as ‘an
almost savage tribe’, whose members ‘go around naked and subsist on
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Map . The Huichol Communities of Jalisco























hunting and ﬁshing like prehistoric man’ – provides a particularly dramatic
example of the failures of this assimilatory programme. However, despite
the popularity of the Huichols with anthropologists, and of Revolutionary
state-building with historians, the SEP’s failures in the Sierra Huichola in
the period have been mentioned only by Beatriz Rojas and Alexander
Dawson, and then only brieﬂy, and without reference to the s. Nor do
most Huichols themselves remember the SEP’s early ‘civilising’ mission in
the Sierra Huichola, testament to its ultimate failure.
Although government oﬃcials tended to blame this failure on what they
saw as the extraordinarily low ‘cultural level’ of the Huichols, I contend
that Huichol resistance was the primary obstacle to their ‘incorporation’,
and that it was both the nature of the federal education system itself, and,
more importantly, the behaviour of its local representatives, that galvanised
this opposition. Through an analysis of how Huichol participation in the
Cristero rebellions and the Cardenista agrarian reform was conditioned by
their relationships with federal schoolteachers, this article sheds light on the
nature and outcomes of the Revolution in the Sierra Huichola, and also pro-
vides insights into the sometimes disastrous consequences of the discrepancies
between oﬃcial government policies and their local-level implementation, as
well as the more radical eﬀects of Revolutionary state-building on rural, and
particularly indigenous, Mexican communities.
Some scholars have taken a relatively sympathetic view of Revolutionary
eﬀorts to assimilate Mexico’s Indians. For example, Andrae Marak writes
that while ‘the oppression that the Tarahumara suﬀered at the hands of local
Secretaría de Educación Pública (Historical Archive of the SEP, AHSEP), Mexico City, /
C//E/.
 J. G. González to José Vasconcelos,  Apr. , AHSEP-/C//E/..
 Beatriz Rojas, Los huicholes en la historia (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional Indigenista
(National Indigenist Institute, INI), ), pp. –; Alexander Dawson, Indian and
Nation in Revolutionary Mexico (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, ), pp. –
, p. .
 Interviews with Salvador Sánchez, elder in Tuxpan de Bolaños,  Mar. ; Mauricio
Montellano, middle-aged member of gobierno tradicional in San Andrés Cohamiata, 
Mar. ; Antonio Candelario, community leader in Las Latas (Santa Catarina
Cuexcomatitlán),  Apr. ; and Jesús Mercado González, elder in Tuxpan de
Bolaños,  Feb. , who, having studied at the Bolaños internado (boarding school),
was the only one to remember anything about schools prior to the s, while asserting
that the internado was the ﬁrst school ever established for Huichols.
 Cf. Mary K. Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in
Mexico, – (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, ); Adrian Bantjes, As if
Jesus Walked the Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the Mexican Revolution (Wilmington,
DE: SR Books, ); Stephen Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution: Forging State and
Nation in Chiapas, – (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press,












































mestizos was self-interested and calculated … that which they suﬀered at the
hands of the SEP, for whatever it was worth, was meant to improve their
lives’. However, such interpretations often reﬂect an overreliance on the dis-
course of SEP ideologues, and on the frequently exaggerated reports of rural tea-
chers (whose jobs, after all, depended on their success in ‘civilising’ their
charges). These views also frequently ignore the Indians’ own, more critical
voices, and overemphasise the federal education system’s attempts to socially
and culturally ‘rehabilitate’ the nation’s most marginalised groups, while under-
playing the abuses of rural teachers, the conﬂicts created by their attempts to
open up Indian lands and resources to outsiders in the name of ‘progress’,
and the fundamental ethnocentrism of the SEP curriculum, which, especially
in the s, sought the destruction of Indian identity, language and culture
in order to create a homogenous, Spanish-speaking Mexican nation.
Under Cárdenas, national-level SEP policy-makers did increasingly promote
the material improvement of the conditions in which Mexico’s Indian popu-
lation lived, and became more tolerant (or even, on occasion, admiring) of
Indian cultural ‘diﬀerence’. However, throughout the s most of the
SEP oﬃcials active in the Sierra Huichola continued to view Huichol
language, autonomous power structures, subsistence-based economy and polit-
ico-religious customary practices – which for the Huichols were all inseparable
parts of a complex known as el costumbre – as obstacles to their assimilation.
They therefore sought to destroy such ‘primitive’ beliefs and customs, or trans-
form them into picturesque ‘folklore’ drained of all meaning. Throughout
the period, many Huichols therefore saw schools as directly challenging
their political autonomy, ethnic identity and costumbre – the destruction of
which, according to Huichol belief, would cause the world as a whole to dis-
appear, or never to have been in the ﬁrst place. Even those more
 Andrae Marak, ‘The Failed Assimilation of the Tarahumara in Postrevolutionary Mexico’,
Journal of the Southwest, :  (), p. .
 Dawson, Indian and Nation, pp. –.
 Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, Teoría y práctica de la educación indígena (Mexico City: INI, ),
pp. –.
 Ibid., p. ; Dawson, Indian and Nation, pp. –; Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –,
p. .
 Ibid., pp. –, pp. –; Dawson, Indian and Nation, pp. –, pp. –.
 Alexander Dawson, ‘From Models for the Nation to Model Citizens: Indigenismo and the
“Revindication” of the Mexican Indian, –’, Journal of Latin American Studies, :
 (), pp. –.
 Note the Huichols’ idiosyncratic masculine version of the word costumbre to refer speciﬁcally
to their political-ceremonial complex, so as to distinguish it from las costumbres in general.
 Aguirre Beltrán, Teoría y práctica, p. –; cf. Dawson, Indian and Nation, pp. – and
especially p. .
 Cf. Jesús Jáuregui and Johannes Neurath (eds.), Fiesta, literatura y magia en el Nayarit:
Ensayos sobre coras, huicholes y mexicaneros de Konrad Theodor Preuss (Mexico City:












































cosmopolitan Huichols who had had positive contacts with mestizos in the
past, and were therefore less worried about such metaphysical threats, felt
that the activities of several rural teachers directly threatened the physical
integrity of their communities. I would therefore position the SEP’s oﬃcial
programme in the Sierra Huichola between  and , and, more import-
antly, the actions of many SEP teachers and inspectors into the s, as an
example not only of Revolutionary eﬀorts towards ‘forjando patria’, but
also within the educational paradigm that Mary Vaughan, drawing on the
work of Marjorie Becker and Brian Street, describes as
[that] undertaken for the purposes of promoting state control and market penetration … [and]
conceptualized and carried out within cultural constructs oblivious to the logic of local practices
of productive, reproductive, and ritual labor. [Such programmes] are disruptive of the delicate eco-
logical and social balances that sustain life upon a precarious resource base. The discourse between
community and teachers is likely to be antagonistic, characterized by resistance, or absent.
Just as in the Indian communities of Sonora and Puebla that Vaughan uses as
examples of this ﬂipside to rural education’s ‘empowering’ potential, the
nature and intensity of Huichol opposition to SEP programmes varied
greatly from community to community, and depended heavily on the behav-
iour of its local representatives. Huichol resistance to their activities often
involved the use of Scottian ‘weapons of the weak’ such as foot-dragging, non-
compliance, evasiveness, obfuscation and the use of native language to confuse
outsiders. However, on occasions the meddling of SEP oﬃcials in local pol-
itics, their perceived facilitation of mestizo land-grabs, or their ‘forced recruit-
ment’ (some would say kidnapping) of children became too much for local
people to bear, which prompted their use of more violent forms of resistance.
Sometimes this meant threats against teachers or even the selective assassin-
ation of these and other government oﬃcials; but as Adrian Bantjes found
in Sonora, where a SEP-led anti-clerical campaign provoked a short-lived
 Dawson, Indian and Nation, pp. –. Forjando patria (‘Forging a nation’, published in
), by the ‘father’ of Mexican anthropology Manuel Gamio, was a manifesto for the cul-
tural assimilation of Mexican Indians.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –; cf. Marjorie Becker, ‘Black and White and Color:
Cardenismo and the Search for a Campesino Ideology’, Comparative Studies in Society and
History, :  (), pp. –, and Brian Street, Literacy in Theory and Practice
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, ), pp. –, pp. –.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –, cf. Ben Eklof, Russian Peasant Schools (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, ), pp. –.
 James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT,
and London: Yale University Press, ), p. xvi, pp. –; cf. Elsie Rockwell, ‘Schools of
the Revolution: Enacting and Contesting State Forms in Tlaxcala, –’, in Gilbert
Joseph and Daniel Nugent (eds.), Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the













































Mayo uprising in the s, the resistance of some Huichols to the cultural,
political and, in particular, the territorial pressures exerted upon them by the
actions of SEP teachers and their Huichol or mestizo allies extended to their
open rebellion against the Mexican state.
Indigenismo, Caciquismo and Factional Conﬂict in the Sierra Huichola
While both ‘New Age’ anthropologists and the Mexican public at large have
tended to see the Huichols as eternally resisting the intrusions of the outside
world in order to preserve their ‘ancestral’ way of life, recent research has done
much to locate Huichol political identities, territoriality and costumbre within
wider Mesoamerican or Mexican contexts (although their participation in
the Revolution remains little studied). In line with this newer scholarship,
I argue that the story of Huichol interactions with the SEP in the
Revolutionary period is not exclusively one of resistance. For although the
Mexican state failed to directly impose control on the Sierra Huichola by
means of schools, my research again coincides with that of Vaughan in
showing that the state did manage to exert some inﬂuence on particular
Huichol communities when, rather than employing force, it tried to negotiate
with local people.
That such negotiations could be carried out in the ﬁrst place, however, was
largely due to the fact that diﬀerent Huichol communities, factions, and
individuals – particularly the caciques – attempted to use the federal
schools, and, more to the point, the teachers in charge of them, to their
own ends. As in much of Mexico, those Huichols most willing to negotiate
with the state were ambitious young men with vested interests in promoting
Revolutionary political and economic change, which they hoped would
open up to them avenues to power and wealth previously inaccessible in
their traditionally gerontocratic and subsistence-based societies. As further
 Bantjes, As If Jesus, pp. –, pp. –.
 Cf. Johannes Neurath, Las ﬁestas de la casa grande (Mexico City: CONACULTA-INAH,
); Paul Liﬀman, Huichol Territoriality and the Mexican Nation (Tucson, AZ:
University of Arizona Press, ).
 With the exception of Rojas, Los huicholes, pp. –; Víctor Tellez Lozano, ‘Lozadistas,
revolucionarios y cristeros’, in Víctor Rojo Leyva, José Reyes Utrera and Adrián Rangel
Aguilar (eds.), Participación indígena en los procesos de independencia y revolución mexicana
(Mexico City: CDI, ), pp. –; Phil Weigand, ‘El papel de los indios huicholes
en las revoluciones del occidente de México’, in Phil Weigand, Ensayos sobre el Gran
Nayar (Mexico, CEMC-INI, ), pp. –; Nathaniel Morris, ‘“The World Created
Anew”: Land, Religion and Revolution in the Gran Nayar Region of Mexico’, Unpubl.
PhD diss., University of Oxford, .
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –, pp. –.
 Cf. Rockwell, ‘Schools’, p. , p. , and Jan Rus, ‘The “Comunidad Revolucionaria
Institucional”: The Subversion of Native Government in Highland Chiapas, –’,












































reward for their cooperation, they also sought the government’s support for
their communities’ agrarian or territorial claims, taking advantage of the
links that the teachers provided with a government that oﬃcially promoted
the idea of agrarian reform to shore up its legitimacy.
However, my conclusions as to the success of such negotiations for either
party do not always coincide with Vaughan’s ﬁndings that ‘factions of villagers
who welcomed and allied with teachers pushed SEP policy in speciﬁc direc-
tions and not in others’. Despite the evolution of SEP policies in the
s, the only teacher to really advocate for Huichol rights in this period
(Inocencio Ramos; see below) quickly lost his job. Meanwhile many of his col-
leagues’ activities continued to provoke Huichol opposition, which by 
had forced the suspension of SEP eﬀorts to ‘incorporate’ them. In fact, if any-
thing the SEP’s programme in the Sierra Huichola provided a generation of
future Huichol leaders with new ways to avoid assimilation in all but its
most superﬁcial aspects. Contact between mestizo teachers and a small
group of young Huichol men enabled the latter to become literate in the
national language, form connections with government oﬃcials and learn
about the culture and politics of the mestizo-ruled nation-state then being con-
structed on the edges of their homeland. As Johannes Neurath points out,
[f]or the Huichols, knowing how mestizos think, and knowing how to be a mestizo, is strategically
beneﬁcial. They practice accumulation of contradictory identities in shamanism, but also in every-
day life. For them the alternative is not to be Indian or Mestizo, but Indian or Indian and
Mestizo.
In many other parts of Mexico, literate Indian ‘scribes’ and bilingual teachers
used their positions as ‘link-men’ between their communities and state
oﬃcials to increase their wealth and power, and by the late s constituted
a new class of communal-level cacique, often just as corrupt, violent and
 Ibid., pp. –.
 Eyler N. Simpson, The Ejido: Mexico’s Way Out (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, ); cf. Daniel Nugent, Spent Cartridges of Revolution: An
Anthropological History of Namiquipa, Chihuahua (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, ), pp. –.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –.
 Weigand, ‘El papel’; José Torres Contreras, Relaciones de frontera entre los huicholes y sus
vecinos mestizos (Zapopan: Colegio de Jalisco, ), pp. –; Fernando Benítez, Los
indios de México, vol.  (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, ), pp. –, pp. –.
 Johannes Neurath, ‘Contrasting Ontologies in the Struggle against Roads and Mining
Companies: Wixarika Cosmopolitics and Ecology’, paper presented at Annual Meeting of
the American Anthropological Association (Denver, CO, ), p. .
 Alan Knight, ‘Caciquismo in Twentieth-Century Mexico’, in Knight and Wil Pansters
(eds.), Caciquismo in Twentieth-Century Mexico (London: Institute for the Study of the
Americas, ), pp. –; cf. Paul Friedrich, Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village












































exploitative as their predecessors. In contrast, many of their Huichol equiva-
lents refrained from advancing overly individualistic or factional agendas, and,
while representing the state within their communities, simultaneously opposed
those government programmes – such as mining, logging and road-building
projects – that they saw as threatening communal integrity and autonomy.
State weakness, the superﬁcial nature of federal schooling eﬀorts in the
region, the traditionally extreme decentralisation of power within Huichol
communities, the continued, ritually-legitimised moral authority of elders
over the population, and a strong sense of collective identity and widespread
belief in magical sanctions for transgressive leaders limited the extent to
which younger, ‘cosmopolitan’ Huichols abandoned older patterns of
thought and behaviour in the s and beyond. Instead, they used what
they had learned from the SEP in the Revolutionary period to manipulate
oﬃcial discourses of ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationhood’, not only to win state con-
cessions for themselves and their followers, but also to facilitate and legitimise
their defence of communal territory and identity from external pressures.
Thus throughout the twentieth century, and both despite and because of the
SEP’s eﬀorts, the Huichols were able to hold on to a higher level of cultural,
territorial and political autonomy than either their mestizo neighbours, or
other Indian peoples such as the Yaquis, Mayos, Purépechas or the highlanders
of Chiapas.
The Sierra Huichola, from Conquest to Revolution
At the turn of the twentieth century, the vast majority of the Huichol popu-
lation – then conservatively estimated at around , individuals – were
dependent on subsistence agriculture and lived in small settlements scattered
across the mountains of northern Jalisco. These settlements, or rancherías,
were inhabited by extended families whose lives were governed by politico-reli-
gious leaders based at the nearest tuki, or Huichol temple (pl. tukite). These
leaders, called kawiterusixi, oﬃciated over rituals involving all the inhabitants
of the surrounding rancherías, which reaﬃrmed the politico-religious and
kinship links between participants, and guaranteed both their own and the
 Rus, ‘Comunidad Revolucionaria Institucional’; Paul Friedrich, The Princes of Naranja
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, ).
 Cf. Scott, Weapons, p. .
 Johannes Neurath, ‘Ambivalencias del poder y del don en el sistema politico ritual wixarika’,
in Berenice Alcántara and Federico Navarrete (eds.), Los pueblos amerindios más allá del
estado (Mexico City: UNAM), pp. –.
 For similar tactical use of education in Tlaxcala, cf. Rockwell, ‘Schools’, p. .
 Bantjes, As If Jesus; Friedrich, The Princes; Rus, ‘Comunidad Revolucionaria Institucional’.
 Censo General de la República Mexicana (Mexico City: Gobierno de la República, ).












































annual maize crop’s health. At a higher level, the diﬀerent tukite and their
dependent rancherías came together to form four distinct Huichol comuni-
dades: Santa Catarina Cuexcomatitlán, San Sebastián Teponahuaxtlán,
Tuxpan de Bolaños (which was partially politico-religiously dependent on
San Sebastián), and San Andrés Cohamiata (whose tuki district of
Guadalupe Ocotán was by this point semi-independent) (see Map ). Each
comunidad was ruled by a gobierno tradicional – made up of cargo-system
oﬃcials and the leaders of each community’s constituent tukite – based at a
ceremonial centre, or gobernancia, named after the comunidad itself, and
which housed little more than a Catholic church, a tuki, a jail, and the
houses and headquarters of the gobierno tradicional. Communal festivals, cele-
brated at both the church and the tuki, regulated and legitimised the power of
the gobierno tradicional, and emphasised the overall unity of the community,
regardless of the frequent rivalries between diﬀerent tuki districts.
These politico-religious structures developed during the Colonial and
Independence periods, during which the Huichols enjoyed a high level of cul-
tural, political and territorial independence vis-à-vis both Church and state,
comparable to that of the Yaqui or perhaps the ‘pagan’ Tarahumara.
However, from the mid-nineteenth century, the Mexican state encouraged
mestizo ranchers and hacendados to ‘colonise’ Huichol landholdings in the
name of ‘productivity’. Especially after , when the government ﬁnally
defeated and killed regional bandit chieftain-turned-agrarian revolutionary
Manuel Lozada and began to reassert itself over his former strongholds, the
physical integrity of the Huichol communities was threatened by settlers
from nearby mestizo towns and haciendas.
Both Church and state also attempted to culturally and politically assimilate
the Huichols into mainstream Mexican society. Catholic schools were estab-
lished in San Andrés and San Sebastián as part of new missions run by the
Zacatecan ‘Joseﬁno’ order, and the Bishop of Zacatecas took several
Huichol children to be educated in a seminary in that city. The missionaries
also encouraged mestizo settlement in San Andrés and San Sebastián, to help
 Cf. Neurath, Las ﬁestas.
 Rojas, Los huicholes, p. .
 Liﬀman, Huichol Territoriality, p. .
 Rojas, Los huicholes, pp. –; cf. Evelyn Hu-Dehart, Yaqui Resistance and Survival: the
Struggle for Land and Autonomy, – (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin
Press, ); Roberto Salmón, ‘Tarahumara Resistance to Mission Congregation in
Northern New Spain, –’, Ethnohistory, :  (), pp. –; Lumholtz,
Unknown Mexico, vol. , pp. –.
 Rojas, Los huicholes, pp. –, pp. –, p. .
 Sebastián Herrera Guevara, ‘Memorias de la misión de San Andrés Cohamiata en el Nayarit,
circa –’, Relaciones. Estudios de historia y sociedad, :  (), pp. –.
 Archivo General de los Misioneros Joseﬁnos (General Archive of the Josephine Missionaries,












































them ‘civilise’ the ‘savage’ Huichols. Furthermore, government-run schools
were also opened in San Sebastián in , and a decade later in Guadalupe
Ocotán and San Andrés, where, according to oﬃcial propaganda, ‘only a few
years ago … Huichol ﬁre worshippers sacriﬁced human victims’. However,
the inhabitants of Guadalupe Ocotán soon caught their teacher stealing mules
and forced him to leave, while San Andrés’ teacher ‘coerced and extorted
them’, and was also expelled. But although the Huichols thus resisted the
abuses of those charged with ‘civilising’ them, they struggled to defend their
communal landholdings against the incursions of mestizo ranchers, which exa-
cerbated territorial conﬂicts between the diﬀerent Huichol communities
themselves.
However, just as missionaries, government oﬃcials and foreign explorers
and anthropologists began to forecast the imminent demise of the Huichols
as a people, the outbreak of the Revolution in  gave them an opportun-
ity to reclaim their political and territorial autonomy. By , many
Huichols had organised themselves into ‘Defensas Rurales’: these were militias
armed by the Carrancista Revolutionary faction and played a key role in
defeating the Villista remnants then roaming northern Jalisco. The leaders
of the Huichol militias also violently expelled almost all of the mestizo settlers
and missionaries from their communities, and at the same time increasingly
contested political control of their communities with the traditionally para-
mount cargo-holders and elders.
After , however, the Huichol Defensas and gobiernos tradicionales
began working together to try and stall renewed mestizo land-grabs, which
were encouraged by municipal authorities who coveted access to the forests,
 Ibid.
 Michele Stephens, ‘“… As Long as They Have Their Land”: The Huichol of Western
Mexico, –’, Ethnohistory, :  (), p. .
 ‘Fragmento de un estudio sobre la raza indígena’, Revista de la Enseñanza Primaria,  Aug.
.
 Rojas, Los huicholes, p. .
 Ibid., p. –.
 Ibid., p. ; Stephens, ‘As Long as They Have Their Land’, pp. –.
 Joaquín Pérez González, Ensayo estadístico y geográﬁco de territorio de Tepic (Tepic:
Imprimadores de Retes, ), p. ; Aleš Hrdlička, Physiological and Medical
Observations among the Indians of Southwestern United States and Northern Mexico
(Washington, DC.: Government Printing Oﬃce, ), p. ; Lumholtz, Unknown
Mexico, vol. , p. xvi.
 Ivor Thord-Gray, Gringo Rebel: Mexico – (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami
Press, ), p. .
 Interview with Pedro Landa, in Manuel Caldera and Luis de la Torre (eds.), Pueblos del viento
norte (Guadalajara: Secretaría de Cultura de Jalisco, ), pp. –.
 Guerrero, ‘Informe’,  Oct. ; in Chiapas, the Chamulas similarly fought to regain
autonomy and expel mestizos from their lands in this period: cf. Rus, ‘Comunidad
Institucional Revolucionaria’, p. .












































pastures, watering holes and mineral riches of the Sierra Huichola. In
response, many Huichols – particularly those of San Andrés and Santa
Catarina – looked to the state and federal governments for support. Much
like their Porﬁrian forebears, however, Mexico’s Revolutionary politicians
and ideologues saw the Huichol communities as isolated bastions of savagery
that needed to be ‘incorporated’ into Mexican civilisation for their own
good. Given the conﬂicted relationship between the Huichols and the muni-
cipal authorities, and the weakness of the federal army’s presence in the Sierra
Huichola, the state’s main instrument in its attempts to assimilate the
Huichols was the SEP, founded by José Vasconcelos in October .
Before the Revolution, Carl Lumholtz reported that the Huichols ‘[did]
not want schools’, because of the abuses committed by the teachers, and
because they believed that literacy and contact with outsiders would lead
their children to ‘lose their native tongue and their ancient beliefs’.
Lumholtz thus recommended that ‘the white teacher’s aim should be to
incite the desire for instruction rather than to force his pupils to listen to
his teachings; not to destroy the Indian’s mental world, but to clear it and
raise it into the sphere of civilisation’. However, Vasconcelos and other
early SEP policy-makers saw the destruction of ‘primitive’ Indian political
structures, languages and ‘superstitions’ as essential to liberating them from
poverty, ‘improving’ them racially, uniting them around a Revolutionary
and nationalist ideal, and opening up for the nation’s beneﬁt the previously
untapped human and natural resources of the countryside. Many
Huichols therefore saw this project as a threat to their culture, language,
and family-unit agricultural production. ‘Our parents wouldn’t let us go
[to school]; they told us, “You’ll come out of school and never want to
help [in the ﬁelds], you’ll sell out your community.”’ Some also saw the pres-
ence of mestizo teachers in their communities, and especially their involve-
ment in questions of agrarian reform, as compromising their own continued
control of communal political life, lands and resources. Just as Vaughan
 Robert Shadow and María Rodríguez Shadow, ‘Religión, economía y política en la rebelión
cristera: El caso de los gobernistas de Villa Guerrero’, Historia Mexicana, :  (),
pp. –; Jean Meyer, La cristiada, vol.  (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, ), pp. –,
pp. –.
 Aguirre Beltrán, Teoría y práctica, pp. –.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, p. .
 Lumholtz, Unknown Mexico, vol. , p. .
 Aguirre Beltrán, Teoría y práctica, p. , pp. –; p. ; Dawson, Indian and Nation,
pp. –; Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –, p. .
 Cristóbal Magallanes to Archbishop of Guadalajara,  June , Archivo Histórico del
Arzobispado Guadalajara, Gobierno, Parroquias: Totatiche, C/ Exp. .
 Author’s interview with Julio Robles, Las Latas (anexo of Santa Catarina Cuexcomatitlán),
Jalisco,  April .












































and Dawson observed in other indigenous regions, the SEP’s early activities
therefore provoked concerted Huichol opposition.
However, some of the Huichol Defensa leaders who had come to power
during the Revolution – and were more accustomed to dealing with mestizos –
saw cooperation with the SEP, and thus with the state itself, as a route to amas-
sing further power and wealth, and winning government protection of their
lands and a measure of autonomy within the new Revolutionary Mexico.
This version of autonomy would, however, be safely overseen by themselves
and a few other members of the emerging elite of young, ambitious
Huichols who, even if they had yet to be incorporated into the national pol-
itical system, had at least been exposed to the cultural and economic inﬂuence
of mestizo society. As in much of Mexico, the SEP therefore became caught up
in factional and generational conﬂicts then emerging within the Huichol
communities.
The SEP’s Early Eﬀorts in the Sierra Huichola, –
In June , Diego Hernández became the ﬁrst of the SEP’s maestros misio-
neros (missionary schoolteachers) charged with ‘civilising’ the Huichols.
However, Hernández was reluctant to give up the comforts of the regional
mestizo hub of Colotlán, and claimed that heavy rains, the Huichols’
concern for their crops, and their dispersed settlement patterns, would make
heading directly for the Sierra a waste of time and eﬀort. Thus the commu-
nities of the Sierra Huichola were largely ignored until late , when a new
SEP budget allotted , pesos for the founding of ‘indigenous cultural
centres’ across the country, and  rural ‘missionaries’ and teachers were
sent out into the countryside. In September  Hernández suggested
founding schools in San Sebastián and Santa Catarina, as their inhabitants,
‘usually so opposed to education, are interested in having schools’.
However, the teachers Hernández nominated to run these schools refused
to transfer to either community, and in November a school was instead
opened in Tuxpan.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –; Dawson, Indian and Nation, p. .
 Cf. Rockwell, ‘Schools’, pp. –; Rus, ‘Comunidad Revolucionaria Institucional’, p. .
 Hernández to DECI,  June , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 ‘SEP Presupuesto –’,  July , AHSEP-/C//E.; in addition to the
Huichols, schools were also planned for the Tarahumaras, the Chamulas, the Yaquis, the
Mayos, the Tarascans, the Zapotecs, the Mixtecs, the ‘indios’ of the Sierra Norte de
Puebla, and the Tepehuanos of Durango.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, p. .
 Hernández to DECI,  Oct. , AHSEP-/C//E/..












































According to the reports of Tuxpan’s teacher, the school was an extraordin-
ary success. Forty-nine children and  adults were initially enrolled, and in
December not a single student dropped out and attendance averaged at only
one below the maximum possible; while in January  new students enrolled,
with average attendance now standing at . These ﬁgures were almost cer-
tainly grossly inﬂated, but the school, surrounded by test-plantings of modern
commercial crops such as coﬀee, oranges, avocados and bananas, did at least
exist, and Hernández and his subordinates were thus by now actively engaged
in trying to transform the Huichols into ‘true industrialists who would know
how to exploit the natural resources they possess’.
The Delahuertista rebellion of late  put a temporary stop to these
eﬀorts. However, after the rebels’ defeat, Tuxpan’s school was reopened,
and another was established in San Sebastián. A rather outlandish and com-
pletely inaccurate total of ‘ Huichols’ (‘ children and  adults’), all of
them male, were apparently enrolled at the latter. It is interesting
that Tuxpan and San Sebastián – which had still not demanded agrarian
reform – were chosen as sites for the Sierra Huichola’s ﬁrst schools, rather
than San Andrés and Santa Catarina, which were in much closer contact
with the Revolutionary state. Perhaps, precisely because they lacked contact
with the state, it was regarded as more important to bring the former commu-
nities into the national fold. However, it is also possible that the local muni-
cipal authorities, motivated by their interest in San Sebastián and Tuxpan’s
landholdings, inﬂuenced the SEP’s decision.
Inspector Hernández enjoyed a cordial relationship with the cacique (and
then municipal president) of Villa Guerrero, Adolfo Valdés y Llanos, to
whom Hernández presented himself on  October  as a prelude to his
ﬁrst major expedition to the Sierra, and who approved the seemingly unre-
liable reports submitted by the teachers of San Sebastián and Tuxpan (in place
of the presidents of Mezquitic and Bolaños, the municipalities to which these
communities respectively belonged). The Valdés family, who together with
the Sánchez controlled the economic and political life of Villa Guerrero,
 J. Rodríguez, ‘Informe’, Nov. , AHSEP-/C//E/..
 Rodríguez, ‘Informe’, Dec. , AHSEP-/C//E/; Rodríguez, ‘Informe’, Jan.
, AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Rodríguez, ‘Informe’, May. , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Hernández to DECI,  June , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 F. Antuna, ‘Informe’, Mar. , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Ibid.
 Valdés y Llanos to DECI,  Apr. , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Hernández to DECI,  Oct. , AHSEP-/C//E/..
 Hernández to DECI,  June , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Shadow and Rodríguez Shadow, ‘Religión, economía’, p. ; Valdés y Llanos to DECI, 













































were united by close commercial, familial and political ties with the Guzmán
family of Bolaños and the Muñoz family of Huajimic (across the state border
with Nayarit). These families had, during the nineteenth century, seized
almost all of the formerly communal lands on the southern edges of the
Sierra Huichola, and were now actively working to take over the lands of
Tuxpan and San Sebastián.
Hernández, on his ﬁrst visit to San Sebastián’s new school, dedicated his
time to what he called the ‘bringing together of mestizos and Indians’. This
involved bringing Luis Huerta, Petronilo Muñoz and Leandro and
J. Guadalupe Sánchez to visit the school and meet with the community’s gov-
ernor. Together, these men represented the main cacical clans of the region;
Leandro Sánchez, for example, was a rich landowner and rancher whose family
led the takeover of the lands of the nearby Tepecano community of Azqueltán
during the Porﬁriato; while Petronilo Muñoz (son of Nieves Muñoz, cacique
of Huajimic) had only the year before seized lands belonging to Guadalupe
Ocotán, and in , under cover of the Cristero Rebellion – or
‘Cristiada’ – stole more than , hectares of San Sebastián’s communal
territory.
Seen in the light of Hernández’s plans for the community’s school and for
the community itself, and in the context of San Sebastián’s future agrarian
conﬂicts with these same men and their families, it is diﬃcult to believe the
meetings that Hernández organised and facilitated did not, at least in part,
concern the potential mestizo settlement of Huichol lands. Typical of the indi-
genista rhetoric espoused by SEP policy-makers in this period, Hernández
saw the Huichols as ‘poor Indians, living monuments to our glorious
people’, who failed to understand that ‘man needs to work, and he who
 Meyer, La cristiada, vol. , p. .
 Robert Shadow, ‘Production, Social Identity and Agrarian struggle among the Tepecano
Indians of Northern Jalisco’, in Ross Crumrine and Phil Weigand (eds.), Ejidos and
Regions of Refuge in Northwestern Mexico (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press,
), pp. –.
 Indeed, the mestizo inhabitants of these towns are today still locked into an often-violent
territorial conﬂict with Tuxpan and San Sebastián. Members of the latter communities
recently occupied  hectares of lands that an agrarian court ruled had been illegally
seized by ranchers from Huajimic ‘in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century’. Juan Partida,
‘Recuperan huicholes de Jalisco tierras en Nayarit’, La Jornada,  Sept. .
 Antuna, ‘Informe’, Apr. , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Shadow and Rodríguez Shadow, ‘Religión, economía’, p. .
 Auts. Trads. to J. Martínez,  Oct. , AGA-D///leg./CCA/Dotación/San
Andrés.
 Unnamed agronomist’s report,  June , AGA-D/.//leg./CCA/RTBC/San
Sebastián.
 Dawson, ‘From Models’, p. , pp. –; Lewis, The Ambivalent Revolution, p. .












































works hardest will live most comfortably’. To that end he actively advocated
that ‘the lands of the Sierra in which the “Huichol” lives, be populated by
honest and hardworking [mestizo] families, whose resolve, honour and work
will infect, forgive me the word, the semi-savage “Huichol”’, which he believed
would bring about ‘the miracle of civilisation in these lands abandoned to
indiﬀerence and selﬁshness’.
Hernández’s view of the commercial potential of Huichol communal
lands – which he claimed possessed ‘natural riches which have never been
exploited to anyone’s beneﬁt; sites for bountiful timber, cattle, mineral and
agricultural production’ – was similar to those of the region’s mestizo caci-
ques who, using almost identical arguments, had long been trying to seize
them. Hernández, together with his patron, Valdés y Llanos, and the
scions of the cacical clans who came with him to San Sebastián’s school,
were therefore natural allies. And it was perhaps because of their combined
inﬂuence, motivated by both ideology and economic self-interest, that
Tuxpan and San Sebastián were chosen as the ﬁrst Huichol communities to
receive federal schools, which Hernández himself openly envisaged as spring-
boards from which to launch the colonisation – or recolonisation – of indigen-
ous lands by ‘hardworking’ mestizos. Although there is no documentary
‘smoking gun’ that proves beyond doubt that this was indeed the case,
Huichol opposition to such plans on the part of Hernández and his
mestizo allies would also help to explain the closure of the schools in San
Sebastián and Tuxpan shortly afterwards, as well as the subsequent com-
plaints of San Sebastián’s authorities that ‘the municipal authorities and
private individuals have long abused our ignorance in order to rob us of our
lands’.
Hernández petitioned hard for the reestablishment of San Sebastián’s
school, and the establishment of new schools in Santa Catarina and San
Andrés. In response, in April  a school was approved for San Andrés
for the ﬁrst time since , where the scale of Huichol resistance to the med-
dling of Hernández and his colleagues in communal agrarian problems was
soon brought into clearer relief. As mentioned above, the new school’s ante-
cedents were far from positive, and, in choosing Antonio Reza to run the
 Hernández to DECI,  Apr. , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Hernández to the DECI’s successor, the Departamento de Escuelas Rurales e Incorporación
Cultural Indígena (Department for Rural Schools and Indigenous Cultural Incorporation,
DERICI),  Sept. , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Ibid.
 Cf. Rojas, Los huicholes, pp. –.
 Hernández to DECI,  Jan. , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Inocencio Ramos to Governor of Jalisco (hereafter Gob.Jal.),  Dec. , Archivo General
Agrario (General Agrarian Archive, AGA), Mexico City, D///leg./CCA/
Restitución/San Sebastián.












































school, Hernández repeated the same mistakes as his predecessors, for Reza
was already an unpopular ﬁgure in San Andrés. Reza had been one of several
‘huicholitos’ taken from San Andrés to Zacatecas before the Revolution to
receive the ‘great beneﬁt’ of a religious education. In , Calixto
Guerrero, former head of San Sebastián’s Joseﬁno mission, described these
Huichol students as having been ‘corrupted by the vices’ they were exposed
to in the city, and notes that on returning to their homes, they became ‘real
monsters of dishonesty and sin, forcing the Huichols, in view of the evils
these learned men caused them, to join together in taking their lives or
driving them into exile’. The people of San Andrés killed one of them
during the Revolution, but two others, including Reza, had ‘miraculously’
escaped this fate in spite of the ‘continuous torment’ they had inﬂicted on
their community.
Reza had returned to San Andrés by March , when he reappears in the
documentary record as the author of a request for agrarian reform for the com-
munity – in spite of the fact that ‘restitution’ proceedings had already been
initiated by the community’s leaders in . Such a unilateral action,
taken by an already unpopular ﬁgure and without the approval of the commu-
nity as a whole, would have met with local opprobrium, which we can assume
was compounded by the activities of unnamed SEP oﬃcials who, in ,
recruited Huichol children for the recently established Casa del Estudiante
Indígena (House of the Indigenous Student) in Mexico City ‘using unconsti-
tutional measures’ – that is, by forcibly ‘seizing them from their lairs’.
Whether or not Reza was directly involved, local people would naturally
have associated him, as a representative of the SEP, with such abuses. It is
perhaps not surprising, then, that in September  Reza was ‘assassinated
by the tribe’. It was furthermore alleged that they ‘they lynched [Reza]
in the community’s TUKI’, suggesting that the community’s kawiterusixi
at least approved Reza’s murder, and indicating that the opposition of conser-
vative elders towards the work of the SEP, and its ‘cosmopolitan’Huichol rep-
resentative, had become a matter of life or death.
Reza’s killing left the Sierra Huichola once again bereft of schools, and was a
‘clear demonstration of the feebleness of our strength, given the scale of this
 Hernández to DERICI,  Apr. , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Guerrero, ‘Informe’,  Oct. .
 Reza to Comité Nacional Agrario (National Agrarian Committee, CNA),  Mar. ,
AGA-D/.//leg./SRA/RTBC/San Andrés.
 V. Poirett to R. Durand,  Jan. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 G. Rodríguez to R. Durand, n.d., quoted in R. Durand to DERICI,  Jan. , AHSEP-
-/C//E/.
 DERICI, Jalisco, ‘Informe’, Nov. , AHSEP-/C//E..












































work’. It is also a clear indication of the depth of the resistance of many
Huichols to the practical application of the Revolutionary nation-building
project. This resistance was by now matched by that of the region’s mestizos,
who were aﬀronted by the increasingly anti-clerical policies of both the Jalisco
state and federal governments. Faced with growing opposition in both the
Huichol communities and the surrounding mestizo-inhabited regions, the
SEP’s activities in northern Jalisco were paralysed from late , and deﬁni-
tively cancelled from August  after the outbreak of the Cristiada.
The majority of the inhabitants of San Sebastián, under the leadership of
Juan Bautista, enthusiastically joined the ‘Cristero’ rebels. Although the
rebels saw the Huichols as ‘heathens’, they shared common enemies in
the form of the government schools and maestros rurales, as well as the
mestizo caciques of Mezquitic, Bolaños, Villa Guerrero and Huajimic, who
sided with the government. However, the leaders of San Sebastián’s semi-
autonomous anexo of Tuxpan refused to declare allegiance to the Cristeros
due to long-standing political tensions with their ‘mother’ community.
Santa Catarina’s leaders also remained loyal to the federal government, due
to a similar long-running feud with San Sebastián, their continued faith in
the state for a solution to their agrarian problems, and furthermore – as no
government rural school had been established in Santa Catarina between
 and  – their lack of contact with abusive or exploitative teachers
who might otherwise have turned them against the government. However, a
dissenting minority faction took the opposing, pro-Cristero side, and many
more of those who wanted to stay neutral ﬂed their homes to escape the
ﬁghting. San Andrés was also split by the rebellion, as the community’s
leaders remained hopeful that the state would help them resolve their agrarian
conﬂicts, but local hostility toward the SEP, made explicit with the murder of
Antonio Reza, seems to have tempered local enthusiasm for the federal govern-
ment and its representatives, and even led some comuneros to side with the
rebels.
 Hernández to DERICI,  Sept. , AHSEP-/C//E/.
 Robert Curley, ‘Anticlericalism and Public Space in Revolutionary Jalisco’, The Americas,
:  (), pp. –.
 Maestro in Puriﬁcación, Jalisco, to DECI,  Jan. , AHSEP-/C//E/..
 Interview with Simón Martínez, in Caldera and de la Torre (eds.), Pueblos, pp. –.
 Weigand, ‘El papel’, p. ; cf. Jennie Purnell, Popular Movements and State Formation in
Revolutionary Mexico (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, ), pp. –
; Philip Dennis, Intervillage Conﬂict in Oaxaca (New Brunswick, NJ, and London:
Rutgers University Press, ), pp. –.












































The SEP’s Return to the Sierra Huichola, –
In June , a treaty – ‘Los Arreglos’ – between the government and the
rebels oﬃcially brought the Cristiada to an end. The ﬁghting had devastated
northern Jalisco, and, regardless of which side they had taken, all the
Huichol communities had suﬀered famine, depopulation and the destruction
of their gobernancias and tukipa (temple complexes), which had weakened
their control over communal landholdings. In fact, San Sebastián was still
being attacked more than a year after the conﬂict oﬃcially came to an end,
when it was reported that ‘the Chief of Mezquitic’s Defensa Social… is steal-
ing the few cattle they still have left’. However, despite the ongoing vio-
lence, in  the federal government renewed its eﬀorts to incorporate the
Huichols into the fabric of the Revolutionary Mexican nation-state. The
SEP was once again the main vehicle for these eﬀorts; this would have been
impossible without the support of pro-government Huichol leaders, who con-
tinued to act as mediators between the SEP’s regional representatives and their
home communities.
As in previous years, however, conservative cargo-system oﬃcers and kawi-
terusixi, and anxious Huichol parents, contested the inﬂuence of mestizo
schoolteachers and their Huichol allies, especially as new SEP campaigns
against ‘superstition’ increasingly targeted the costumbre that regulated
Huichol religious, social, political and economic life. In the name of increas-
ing rural ‘productivity’, or with a view to personal gain, certain SEP oﬃcials
also again encouraged mestizo attempts to ‘colonise’ Huichol lands.
Huichol resistance to both the cultural and territorial threats posed them by
the SEP, mestizo ranchers and regional municipal authorities thus continued
to obstruct their ‘incorporation’, and also exacerbated inter-communal and
inter-factional conﬂicts rooted in the recent violence.
In early , Inspector Ramón Durand was sent to the Sierra Huichola
and instructed, in line with national-level policy, to recruit more Huichol stu-
dents for the Casa del Estudiante Indígena in Mexico City, rather than set up
schools in the shattered Huichol communities. Victorio Poirett, a teacher
working near Colotlán, warned Durand that ‘we will not manage to recruit
them through persuasion’, and instead suggested sending ‘some armed men
to surprise the Indians in their huts and grab their kids’, just as had been
 Robert Zingg, Los huicholes: Una tribu de artistas, vol.  (Mexico City: INI, ), p. ;
Ezequiel Haro to Puig Casauranc,  Aug. , AHSEP--/C//E/; unnamed
agronomist’s report,  Sept. , AGA-D/.//leg./CCA/RTBC/San Sebastián.
 Ramos to Director de Educación Federal, Jalisco (Director of Federal Education, DEFJ), n.d.
[late ], AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –.
 Simpson, The Ejido, pp. –.












































done in . Poirett added that the mestizos of Mezquitic, Bolaños or
Chimaltitán, the towns closest to the Sierra Huichola, could be counted on
to help them in this endeavour – reﬂecting the violence that typiﬁed the
relations between the Huichols and their mestizo neighbours. Alternatively,
Poirett suggested that ‘a very pro-government Huichol friend of mine’
could assist them, as long as they did not try to recruit children in
San Sebastián, because ‘this Huichol cannot meet those Indians, as they
are Cristeros’ – demonstrating the extent to which tensions between pro-
and anti-government groups continued to dominate life in the Sierra
Huichola. Durand forwarded Poirett’s advice to his superiors, who recog-
nised that arming local mestizos to forcibly recruit Huichol children for the
SEP would only create new tensions between the Huichols and the state,
and replied that ‘if it is impossible to get the Indians to come of their own
free will, it would be preferable not to bring them at all’. Shortly after,
however, another local teacher, Genaro Rodríguez, delivered ﬁve Huichol chil-
dren to the Casa. He did not explain how he had recruited them, but given
that they ran away within a month, it appears they were unenthusiastic about
leaving their homes and their families, perhaps forever, for an education in
Mexico City.
In the wake of this failure, and with national indigenous education policies
once again promoting the establishment of schools for Indian children within
their own communities, Inocencio Ramos replaced Durand as inspector in
the Sierra Huichola in late . In line with the increasingly radical indigen-
ista discourses emanating from the SEP’s national oﬃces, and in sharp con-
trast to the actions and attitudes of the oﬃcials previously sent to the region,
Ramos was determined to defend ‘the interests of the Indian … with a
prudent attitude and within Constitutional norms’,  and quickly won
the cooperation of Huichol leaders by bringing their problems to the attention
of the federal government.
In San Sebastián, for instance, Ramos drafted a complaint on behalf of the
communal authorities, informing his superiors that local pro-government
Defensas were stealing their cattle, and asked that they ‘give [them] guarantees.
Because otherwise [they] are in danger, and you have said we have to open our
 Poirett to Durand,  Jan. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 DERICI to Durand,  Feb. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 DERICI to Rodríguez,  Feb. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 DERICI to Rodríguez,  Mar. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Alexander Dawson, ‘“Wild Indians,” “Mexican Gentlemen,” and the Lessons Learned in
the Casa del Estudiante Indígena, –’, The Americas, :  (), pp. –.
 Dawson, ‘From Models’, pp. –.
 DEFJ to DERICI,  July , AHSEP--/C//E/.












































eyes to the Indian.’ Ramos also began to help the Huichol communities
with their various agrarian claims, which had been frozen since  as a con-
sequence of the Cristiada, and which the municipal authorities, who sup-
ported the mestizo settlement of Huichol lands, were trying to block.
In return for his help, San Sebastián’s elders gave Ramos permission to
establish a school ‘under the roof of their courthouse’ until new classrooms
could be built, while Tuxpan’s communal assembly also approved a new
school. A few months later, San Andrés’ authorities similarly sought to
demonstrate their loyalty to the government by not only approving a
school, but also promising to set aside , square metres of land on
which teachers could demonstrate new crops and improved agricultural tech-
niques, the products of which would support the school and its pupils.
Ramos must have felt buoyed by these successes, and by the increased
importance that Narciso Bassols, appointed Education Secretary in October
, accorded to indigenous education. Bassols was a Marxist, an anti-cler-
ical and a prominent supporter of agrarian reform, and immediately set about
reforming the curriculum, ‘supplement[ing] existing policy emphasising
peasant behaviour reform with an intensiﬁed attack on superstition [and] reli-
gious practice’, which he sought to repackage as ‘folklore’, or, when this
was incompatible with social and economic ‘progress’, to replace with civic cel-
ebrations. He also ordered SEP oﬃcials across the nation to introduce anti-
alcohol and sanitation programmes into the communities in which they
worked, set up local postal services, encourage sporting events and estab-
lish boarding schools – internados indígenas – which he viewed as the best
means of transforming Indians into productive members of Mexican
society. All of the federal schools would teach Indian children Spanish,
basic literacy and numeracy, and introduce improved agricultural techniques,
logging, tanning, and other small-scale industries into their communities.
Just as in the schools set up for Indian and Aboriginal children in the
 Ramos to DEFJ, n.d. [late ], AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Comisión Local Agraria (Local Agrarian Commission, CLA) of Mezquitic, to Gob.Jal., 
June , AGA-D/.//leg./SRA/RTBC/San Sebastián.
 Ramos, ‘Informe’,  Nov. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Ibid.
 DEFJ to DERICI,  Mar. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., p. , p. .
 Narciso Bassols, Obras, cited in Aguirre Beltrán, Teoría y práctica, pp. –.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, p. .
 Ibid., p. , pp. –; Gilbert Joseph, ‘Rethinking Mexican Revolutionary Mobilization:
Yucatan’s Seasons of Upheaval, –’, in Joseph and Nugent (eds.), Everyday
Forms, p. .
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –.












































United States and Australia at around the same time, in the Sierra Huichola
‘the manual labor of young children [was seen as] critical for the eﬃcient
conduct of the schools’.
Knowing that winning government support for Huichol land claims was
key to keeping them on his side, and encouraged by Bassols’ agrarista tenden-
cies, in late  Ramos travelled to Guadalajara to secure a land registry
certiﬁcate for San Sebastián. This secured him the friendship of former
Cristero leader Juan Bautista, who – contrary to Phil Weigand’s assertion
that, after the collapse of the rebellion in , he continued ﬁghting a ‘defen-
sive war’ in the mountains – had instead returned peacefully to his commu-
nity, where Ramos described him as ‘President of the Indians’. Bautista
probably saw supporting the government school as a way of reconciling with
the state and saving the lives of himself and his followers, and he agreed to
become head of the local ‘education committee’. On  July he helped
organise a meeting between Ramos, a federal military commander and San
Sebastián’s traditional authorities. With Bautista translating, Ramos explained
to them
the mission that the teachers, on behalf of Jalisco’s Federal Education Department, in its grand
desire for learning, would develop among the Huichol tribe, so as to bring them closer to the
Civilised Peoples … [The Huichols] understand they must send their children to the school
that, from the st of this month, has been opened for their instruction, and they are satisﬁed
with the beneﬁts that the government gives them.
In return, the communal authorities demanded ‘the government’s frank and
eﬀective protection, as this tribe has long been harassed by elements at the
service of the neighbouring municipal authorities’. Ramos’ advocacy of
these claims seems to have surprised and perhaps even worried Jalisco’s
Director of Federal Education, who responded by warning his own superior,
Rafael Ramírez, that ‘I am about to bring the complaints of [Ramos] and
the Indians to the appropriate authorities … but I am letting you know in
advance in case this will provoke any diﬃculties’ – probably a reference
to potential conﬂicts between government agencies sympathetic to the
Huichols’ plight, and the municipal authorities accused of persecuting them.
 James Carroll, ‘The Smell of the White Man Is Killing Us: Education and Assimilation
among Indigenous Peoples’, U.S. Catholic Historian, :  (), p. .
 Simpson, The Ejido, pp. –, pp. –; Aguirre Beltrán, Teoría y práctica, pp. –.
 Ing. Balderas, ‘Informe’,  Nov. , AGA-D///leg./CCA/Restitución/San
Sebastián.
 Weigand, ‘El papel’, p. .
 Ramos to DEFJ, n.d. [late ], AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Ramos, ‘Informe’,  Nov. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Ramos, ‘Informe’,  July , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Ibid.












































Ramírez did not obstruct Ramos’ activities, which now included petitioning
for the ‘restitution’ of Huichol lands on behalf of San Sebastián and
Tuxpan. The traditional governors of both communities, as well as local
caciques Cenobio de la Cruz, Zenón Romero, Santos de la Cruz, Pascual
González and Juan Bautista, all signed Ramos’ petition. These men had
fought one another during the Cristiada, and would soon be divided again
by the so-called ‘Segunda’Cristiada. For the moment, however, their collective
anxiety over the security of both communities’ landholdings triumphed over
the long-standing tensions between them.
In January , the process of ‘restitution’ for San Sebastián and Tuxpan
oﬃcially began. The authorities in Mezquitic attempted to block the
communities’ joint claim, arguing that ‘titles or documents mentioning the
theft of lands about which the indigenous complain are inexistent …
Furthermore… this authority is not responsible for these imaginary disposses-
sions.’ However, in February the communities’ claim was published in the
Diario Oﬁcial, and in July  Ramos and a commission of Huichols again
travelled to Guadalajara, where they received a provisional title to San
Sebastián and Tuxpan’s lands. Shortly after, three agronomists arrived in
San Sebastián to survey the community’s territory, which they judged to be
larger than needed, and tried to surreptitiously reduce by around , hec-
tares. However, the agronomists’ activities aroused Huichol suspicions and,
as ‘experience has taught these people that such pretexts are used to seize their
lands’, Ramos accompanied the community’s authorities to Mexico City ‘to
prove their case with titles in hand at the National Land Registry’. There
they managed to have the agronomists’ decision overturned and ﬁle a new
claim for the restitution of all their traditional territory.
While Ramos provided invaluable assistance to various Huichol communi-
ties, few Huichols reciprocated by sending their children to the new schools. In
San Sebastián, despite Ramos’ attempts to organise farming and logging coop-
eratives, build separate classrooms for boys and girls, and sow ﬁve hectares of
communal land to supply grain for the school and its pupils, attendance
remained low. As in many other parts of Mexico, the community refused
to allow girls to attend until a female teacher could be found for them,
 Ramos to Gob.Jal.,  Dec. , AGA-D///leg./CCA/Restitución/San Sebastián.
 José Egurvido to CLA Mezquitic,  Feb. , AGA-D///leg./CCA/Restitución/
San Sebastián.
 Diario Oﬁcial de la Federación,  Feb. .
 Ing. Balderas, ‘Informe’,  Nov. , AGA-D///leg./CCA/Restitución/San
Sebastián.
 Ramos to DEFJ,  Aug. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Ramos, ‘Informe’,  Nov. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Cf. Vaughan, Cultural Politics, p. –, pp. –, pp. –.












































while the majority of the boys who attended were orphans or fatherless chil-
dren who lacked clothes and food. When supplies of maize – the only
food available – were exhausted, such pupils returned home until Ramos
could secure enough grain to feed them again. In the run-up to the rainy
season, even the few Huichol children who were sent to the school to learn
Spanish and other skills, rather than just to get free meals, were withdrawn
by their parents to help with family-unit agricultural labour, often at
rancherías several days’ walk from the school.
Meanwhile, schools in San Andrés, Tuxpan and Santa Catarina had ceased
to function due to the ‘lamentable failures of the teachers charged with estab-
lishing them’. However, as Ramos’ superiors refused to dismiss these
indiﬀerent and ineﬃcient teachers, preferring instead to transfer them to
mestizo villages in less remote areas, the Huichol schools remained
unstaﬀed. Conﬂicts within Jalisco’s SEP administration, together with
the brief rebellion of a group of former Cristeros in the Jalisco–Zacatecas bor-
derlands, soon forced even San Sebastián’s school to close, and further
delayed any new SEP initiatives in the Sierra Huichola.
The defeat of the rebels, and appointment of Erasto Valle as Jalisco’s
Director of Federal Education, which put an end to internal SEP
conﬂicts, allowed Ramos to reopen San Sebastián’s school in February
, and establish another in Santa Catarina in March. Luis Carrillo,
one of the few Huichol alumni of the Casa del Estudiante Indígena not to
have returned to ‘the customs of his race, with tendencies to continue the
nomadic life of their ancestors’, was put in charge in Santa Catarina.
Meanwhile Valle himself announced a project to establish boarding schools
for the Huichols on state-owned land. Referencing the colonial policy of ‘con-
gregation’, and Vasconcelos’more recent ideas of teachers as ‘missionaries’,
Valle envisaged the dotación (concession) of state lands to Huichol families as a
way of concentrating the population, ‘as in the remote past they congregated
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Sevilla to DEFJ,  May , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 DEFJ to DERICI,  July , AHSEP-: C//E/; Sevilla to DEFJ,  May
, AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Sevilla, ‘Informe’,  July , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 DEFJ to Sevilla,  July , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Zenaido Pimienta, Episodios históricos de la educación en Jalisco (Guadalajara: Talleres Vera,
), p. .
 Ramos, ‘Informe’,  Apr. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Pimienta, Episodios históricos, p. ; cf. Vaughan, Cultural Politics, p. .
 Sevilla to DEFJ,  Apr. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 ‘Las Noticias’,  Mar. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Sevilla, ‘Informe’,  Apr. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Lino Gómez Canedo, ‘Huicot: Antecedentes Misionales’, Estudios de Historia Novohispana,












































around churches’. In turn, this would solve the problems that dispersed
Huichol settlement patterns had long presented the SEP.
In March, Valle set oﬀ on a tour of the Sierra to ﬁnd potential sites for the
planned internados. On his return, he reported that the Huichols numbered
around ,, were ‘greatly attached to their customs and reluctant to assimi-
late themselves to the customs of the whites and mestizos’, and lived ‘miser-
able’ lives due to their ‘ancestral laziness … preferring to hunt rather than
raise animals and [being] resistant to farming, except in a small-scale and rudi-
mentary manner’. However, despite having suﬀered ‘the worst disillusion
on realising that from this tribe one can expect neither material nor moral
aid’, Valle suggested establishing internados in San Sebastián, San Andrés
and Las Latas (one of Santa Catarina’s most important tukipa).
Foreshadowing the emphasis that the SEP under Cárdenas would put on
improving material conditions in Mexico’s indigenous communities, each
of Valle’s planned Huichol internados would be staﬀed by a male director
and a female assistant, who would together teach  pupils to speak, read
and write Spanish, raise crops and animals more eﬃciently, build ‘better’
houses, eat ‘better’ food, and wear ‘better’ clothes. Once they had been
trained, the Huichol graduates would receive agricultural equipment and
plots of land near the school, while local teachers would try to ensure that
the graduates ‘do not disconnect themselves morally and intellectually from
[either] the school or their families’.
However, the huge projected cost of the project – at , pesos per year – led
Valle’s superiors to reject his plans, while the Huichols themselves also used
mestizo ignorance of the Huichol language to undermine Valle’s attempts to
impose on them a ‘foreign’ culture. In San Andrés, for example, one of
Valle’s subordinates managed to win local approval for the establishment of an
internado. But just as a communal assembly was to oﬃcially conﬁrm its support,
An old Huichol … asked in his language that [the traditional governor] pause, and then bowing
his head three times spoke a few words [in Huichol] to the others, which they discussed ani-
matedly. Then the governor asked me: ‘You will yourself direct the school and be responsible
for the other teachers who come?’ ‘No’, I said, ‘I have no academic titles or diplomas and further-
more, the government will decide whom to send.’ He [the governor] replied: ‘The community
doesn’t want the school if you will not direct it, and so we will not [approve it].’
 DEFJ to DERICI,  Feb. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 ‘Las Noticias’,  Mar. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Ibid.
 Dawson, ‘From Models’, pp. –.
 Cf. Vaughan, Cultural Politics, pp. –; pp. –.
 Valle, ‘Plan educativo’,  May , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Ramírez to Valle,  June , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Cf. Scott, Weapons, pp. –.
 Macías to newly-formed Departamento de Educación Indígena (Department for Indigenous












































Given their past experiences with mestizo teachers, it is not surprising that the
elders of San Andrés would trust only those whom they had already met and
who would take personal responsibility for any conﬂicts that their presence
might cause. Thus the errors of Valle’s predecessors in dealing with the
Huichols now scuppered his own plan to establish new internados in their
communities.
Meanwhile northern Jalisco’s mestizo ex-Cristeros were again on the
warpath. Armed ‘fanatics’ now posed a growing threat to the region’s
SEP oﬃcials, one of whom was murdered near Colotlán in August, and
by December many local schools were unable to function because it was no
longer safe to travel on local roads. In January  Bassols added sexual
education classes to his controversial ‘socialist’ curriculum, which further
enraged both Catholic parents and ex-Cristeros, many of whom, a month
later, declared war on the Revolutionary state. Throughout the new rebel-
lion, Santa Catarina’s authorities remained as strongly pro-government as they
had been during the ﬁrst Cristiada. The leaders of Tuxpan’s pro-government
Defensa also continued to look to the federal government to protect them
from mestizo land-grabs, and with Ramos’ recent support in their agrarian
petitioning and their feud with San Sebastián’s ex-Cristeros still fresh in their
minds, they remained pro-government throughout the Second Cristiada.
Meanwhile both Cristeros and pro-government militiamen threatened San
Andrés’ lands, and the community tried again to remain neutral, while
many in San Sebastián again sided with the rebels, at least in part as a reaction
to the provocative actions of the teacher Apolonio González (see below).
The SEP and ‘La Segunda Cristiada’, –
In August , Inocencio Ramos was dismissed from his post on charges of
‘exploiting the Huichols’. However, these accusations were never substan-
tiated, and seem unlikely given his well-documented advocacy on behalf
of Tuxpan and San Sebastián, with which he persisted, ﬁrst in a private cap-
acity, and later as an employee of the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas
 David Raby, ‘Los maestros rurales y los conﬂictos sociales en México, –’, Historia
Mexicana, :  (), pp. –.
 Valle, ‘Informe anual’,  Aug. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Rubalcaba to DERICI,  Dec. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Braulio Rodríguez, ‘Circular’,  Jan. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Ibid.; DEFJ to DERICI,  June , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 C. de la Cruz, Z. Romero and P. Chino to CNA,  Mar. , AGA-D/.//leg./
SRA/RTBC/Tuxpan.
 Communal leaders to CNA,  May , AGA-D/.//leg./SRA/RTBC/San
Andrés; Balderas, ‘Informe’,  Nov. , AGA-D///leg./CCA/Restitución/San
Sebastián.












































(Department for Indigenous Aﬀairs, DAI). In fact, it was probably precisely
this advocacy, and the ire it aroused amongst the region’s mestizo caciques,
which led an unknown but clearly inﬂuential claimant to level these accusa-
tions against him in the ﬁrst place. After all, even Valle himself had noted
that those who exploited Mexico’s Indians often used the support of ‘very
inﬂuential persons’ to evade charges brought against them by conscientious
indigenista teachers; this ‘sometimes leads to the punishment of the teacher
himself, which makes the Indian lose his faith on seeing that [the teacher]
is powerless to do anything in his favour’. Reinforcing the hypothesis
that powerful local interests orchestrated Ramos’ dismissal is the fact that
his successor, a mestizo from just outside Mezquitic named Apolonio
González, was closely connected to the region’s mestizo elite, and had in
fact co-founded Mezquitic’s Defensa force, which his close friend
Griseldo Salazar now commanded.
Soon after González took up his post in the community, he and Salazar,
‘with wicked intentions and [taking] advantage of the ignorance of the
Huichol Indians’, together applied on behalf of San Sebastián for a govern-
ment ‘dotación de ejidos’ (roughly speaking, ‘communal land grant’), in an
attempt to void the community’s existing application for ‘restitution’ and
so ‘take control of these lands for themselves’. González’s ﬂagrant abuse
of his position to threaten the community’s landholdings, in partnership
with no less than the hated Griseldo Salazar, was compounded by his selling
mezcal from inside his classroom, and contributed to Juan Bautista
drawing back from reconciliation with the Revolutionary government and rea-
ligning himself with the region’s resurgent ex-Cristeros. However, San
Sebastián’s traditional authorities were reluctant to back Bautista’s new rebel-
lion, given their suﬀering during the ﬁrst Cristiada, and the positive relation-
ship they had enjoyed with Inocencio Ramos. The community was left
divided, and many of San Sebastián’s families ﬂed to pro-government
Tuxpan in an attempt to escape involvement in the conﬂict.
Rebel violence reached the Huichol communities in December , when
two bodies were found near San Sebastián’s contested boundary with Santa
Catarina. Griseldo Salazar used this as an excuse to step up his Defensa’s
 Valle to DERICI,  Feb. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Martínez, in Caldera and de la Torre (eds.), Pueblos, pp. –.
 Enrique Cárdenas, ‘Informe’,  Nov. , AGA-D/.//Leg./SRA/Restitución/
San Andrés.
 Ramos to DEFJ,  Feb. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Tomás de la Rosa Estrada to Pres. Cárdenas,  Dec. , Archivo General de la Nación,
Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas (National General Archive, Lázaro Cárdenas Foundation, AGN-
LC), ./.
 Julio Vindiola to Dept. Agrario,  Sept. , AGA-D///leg./CCA/Restitución/
San Sebastián.












































attacks on San Sebastián. In the same month, Apolonio González was
forced by Bautista’s rebel ﬁghters to ﬂee back to his home near
Mezquitic, where he was killed soon afterwards by Cristeros led by Juan
Bautista’s mestizo compadre, Pepe Sánchez. A few weeks later, Bautista
and Sánchez joined forces and ambushed and killed Commander Salazar
himself, somewhere in the Sierra near San Sebastián.
Even as at national level the number of SEP teachers in the countryside
reached a high of ,, and Jalisco’s school inspectors boasted that
across the state ‘the teacher … is [now] the soul of the community’,
the renewed violence disrupted the SEP’s mission in the Sierra Huichola,
and the last school in the region, in Santa Catarina, was closed in April
, due to ‘the tenacious resistance of the Huichols to the National
Government’s cultural work’. Although no replacement schools could be
set up in the Sierra Huichola itself, plans were nonetheless made to establish
an internado for Huichol children in Bolaños, where it would be guarded by
the local Defensa. Once again, the SEP hoped to congregate the dispersed
Huichol population around the internado in order to better ‘attract them
to culture’, while, in line with the materialist bent of the SEP’s programme
under Cárdenas, its staﬀ would promote ‘the exploitation of the region’s
raw materials … taking into account that as the Huichols are hunters, they
have the necessary components for the manufacture of shoes’.
The internado in Bolaños opened its doors in late , but few Huichol
parents would send their children there. The building was windowless and
in terrible condition, the students were neglected and mistreated, and one
Huichol child died there as a result. The school’s director ‘responded to
these problems by acting [in an] increasingly authoritarian [manner]’,
and asked President Cárdenas to send federal troops to ‘visit the indigenous
pueblos in order to convince them to contribute a contingent of students to
the school’. Such coercive tactics only increased the opposition of parents
and children to the school, while Bautista and Sánchez’s rebels frequently
 Rosa Estrada to Pres.,  Dec. , AGN-LC/./.
 Samuel Pérez to DEFJ,  April , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Federación de Maestros Feds. de Jal. to Gob.Jal.,  Apr. , AHSEP--/C//E/
; Jesús Sánchez Martínez, A contra corriente (Guadalajara: Palibrio, ), p. .
 Aurelio Muñiz Vargas to Pres.,  June , AGN-LC/E//.
 Vaughan, Cultural Politics, p. .
 ‘Meeting of Jalisco School Inspectors’,  Sept. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 DEFJ to Samuel Pérez,  Apr. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Montoya to DEFJ,  Oct. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 ‘Las Noticias’,  Sept. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Dawson, Indian and Nation, p. .
 Ibid.
 Ávila Vázquez to Pres. Cárdenas,  Oct. , AGN-LC/C//E/./.












































ambushed the teachers, pro-government Huichols and their armed escorts
during their recruiting missions. In early , Cristero attacks and
general Huichol resistance forced the internado to close. The ongoing
regional violence, the dispersal of the Huichol population in the face of the
ﬁghting, and, most of all, their by-now extreme distrust of schools, prevented
the SEP from establishing replacements in the ruined Huichol gobernancias,
even after local support for the rebels evaporated with Bautista’s death at
the hands of Tuxpan’s Defensa in . Thus SEP policy-makers, already
disillusioned by their previous failures and stretched for funding, abandoned
any further attempts to ‘incorporate’ the Huichols until well into the
s, and teachers would not return en masse to the Sierra until the
launch of the regional ‘Huicot’ development plan in the late s.
Conclusions
Between  and , then, the Huichols managed to defy the attempts of
the Revolutionary state to ‘incorporate’ them into the Mexican nation, con-
founding turn-of-the-century predictions that they would ‘soon disappear by
fusion with the great nation to whom they belong’. In part, their survival as
a distinct people was due to the willingness of some Huichol leaders to com-
promise with the state. By portraying themselves as eager for education, these
individuals won (limited) federal government support for communal claims,
which at the very least resulted in the launching of the restitution process
for San Sebastián and Tuxpan in the early s. However, examples of
rural teachers and Huichol leaders working together for the good of the com-
munity – epitomised by Inocencio Ramos managing to bring together former
Cristeros and pro-government Defensa leaders in order to work towards
winning oﬃcial recognition of their joint landholdings – are few and far
between. And even Ramos’ own eﬀorts, in line with shifts in national-level
SEP policy towards working with rural people to ‘identify and defend commu-
nal interests’, were undermined by the provocative actions of other teachers
and government agronomists, and by the cupidity and obstructionism of
regional actors who coveted Huichol landholdings.
 G. Ceja Torres to DEFJ,  Nov. , AHSEP--/C//E/; Antonio López
Mendoza to Pres. Cárdenas,  Feb. , AGN-LC/C/.
 Dawson, Indian and Nation, p. .
 ‘Murió en un tiroteo el rebelde Bautista’, El Porvenir,  Sept. .
 Guillermo Liera to DAI,  Feb. , AHSEP--/C//E/.
 Plan Lerma Asistencia Técnica, Operación Huicot (Guadalajara: Poder Ejecutivo Federal,
).
 Lumholtz, Unknown Mexico, vol. , p. xvi.












































For despite evidence that, during Cárdenas’ presidency, rural teachers across
the country faced up to ‘their own limitations and … vigorous community
defence of cultural practices’ and moderated their often iconoclastic zeal,
most SEP oﬃcials continued to see the Huichols as ‘backward’ and ‘savage’
throughout the Revolutionary period. They depended on coercion to recruit
Huichol students for unpopular schools, and even, in some cases, used agrarian
legislation and their ties to municipal authorities to machinate against their
Huichol hosts. Ultimately, these oﬃcials caused as many problems for the
Huichols as the Huichol leaders’ demonstrations of loyalty to the Mexican
state could solve.
The Huichol response to the threats posed by federal and municipal oﬃcials
and their local mestizo allies to their political, cultural and territorial auton-
omy was thus also typiﬁed, throughout the Revolutionary period, by wide-
spread resistance. Huichol use of ‘weapons of the weak’, and more violent
tactics such as assassinations or even, in the case of San Sebastián and minority
factions elsewhere, armed rebellion against the state, obstructed their assimila-
tion into the Mexican mainstream. Even in pro-government Santa Catarina,
local opposition and regional violence forced the community’s school to
close in the mid-s. Thus towards the end of the Revolutionary period,
a single internado was left to serve the entire Huichol population of northern
Jalisco, and, in the face of rebel attacks and the refusal of Huichol parents to
allow their children to attend, even this was forced to close.
While the Huichols suﬀered greatly during the two decades of tumult that
followed the end of the armed phase of the Revolution in  – a period in
which many tukipa and the communal gobernancias were destroyed and an
unknown number of Huichols were killed and many more were forced to
ﬂee their homes as refugees – the Huichol population as a whole therefore
emerged from the Revolutionary period still in possession of a distinct
culture, a high level of political autonomy, and vast areas of communal land.
This does not mean, however, that federal government agencies, regional
caciques and local mestizo ranchers ceased to threaten them. Towards the
very end of Cárdenas’ presidency, the agronomists whom the Huichols had
long been asking for ﬁnally arrived in the region. However, far from helping
the Huichols to defend their territorial claims as might be expected of repre-
sentatives of Cárdenas’ indigenista regime, they reported, using language close
to that of their Porﬁrian predecessors, that ‘demarcation [of their lands] with
not resolve the Indians’ problems, as these are not agrarian, but rather
 Ibid., pp. –.
 Phil Weigand, ‘Diﬀerential Acculturation among the Huichol Indians’, in Thomas Hinton
and Phil Weigand (eds.), Themes of Indigenous Acculturation in Northwest Mexico (Tucson,












































economic, racial and ambient’. They then reiterated Inspector Hernández’s
earlier proposals: that, in order to ‘improve this terrible situation, migrations
in both directions must be brought about; that is, colonise Huichol lands, and
attract large numbers of [Huichols] to the major population centres’. This
was already happening in practice, as mestizo ranchers from Nayarit, supported
by that state’s government, embarked on violent new incursions into the ter-
ritories of Tuxpan, San Sebastián and San Andrés, while the federal govern-
ment provisionally awarded an insultingly small title to its long-term allies
in Santa Catarina.
Many Huichol leaders – including some who had previously believed that
supporting government schools would win them government support for
their agrarian struggles – saw the agronomists’ recommendations, the
resumed mestizo land-grabs and the outcome of Santa Catarina’s struggle
for title to its lands as a betrayal. They accused all the federal government’s
representatives – including those they now described as the SEP’s ‘inept
and unsympathetic teachers’ – of being as committed to destroying their
communities as were the mestizo ranchers. Thus into the s, even the
‘cosmopolitan’ Huichol elite became more combative in their dealings with
the Mexican state, as at the same time a new generation of Huichol
leaders began to emerge, many of them former students of the short-lived
federal schools.
However, in contrast to the situation in many other Indian regions, and
testament to the ultimate failure of the SEP’s programme in the Sierra
Huichola between  and , schooling had not transformed these
men (and they were all men) into ‘Mexicans’ amenable to cooperation with
regional elites and the federal government, but rather into resolutely
‘Huichol’ leaders who were now better equipped to negotiate communal
demands with the emergent PRIísta regime. By manipulating the oﬃcial
discourses of ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationhood’ that they had picked up from
themaestros rurales, as well as their ability to speak, read and write the national
language, leaders like the Huichol teacher Agustín Carrillo Sandoval were able
 The neo-Porﬁrian attitudes of these agronomists, and their lack of traditional Cardenista
sympathy for ‘oppressed Indians’, reﬂect the growing power of conservative forces in
Mexican (and especially provincial) politics in the late s, culminating in Manuel
Ávila Camacho’s accession to the presidency in ; cf. Vaughan, Cultural Politics,
p. ; Bantjes, As If Jesus, p. .
 Alonso Guerrero to Dept. Agrario,  Apr. , AGA-D/.//leg./CCA/RTBC/
Tuxpan.
 Morris, ‘The World Created Anew’, pp. –.
 Mijares Cossío to Pres. Cárdenas,  July , AGN-LC/C//E/./.
 Community representatives to Dept. Agrario,  Feb. , AGA-D/.// leg./
CCA/RTBC/San Sebastián.
 Rus, ‘Comunidad Revolucionario Institucional’, pp. –.












































to facilitate and legitimise their continued use of subversion, accommodation,
evasion, and active, sometimes violent resistance, in defence of the cultural,
political and territorial autonomy of their communities that the SEP, between
 and , had tried so hard to destroy, and which, despite its subsequent
eﬀorts alongside other government agencies, the Huichols of northern Jalisco
still enjoy today.
Spanish and Portuguese abstracts
Spanish abstract. Los intentos por utilizar la escuela para asimilar a los huicholes
dentro del estado-nación revolucionario promovieron el desarrollo de diferentes alian-
zas y conﬂictos en su patria chica, involucrando a comunidades y facciones huicholes
rivales, a mestizos locales, a funcionarios gubernamentales y a rebeldes cristeros. La
provocación de los maestros, la avaricia de los caciques mestizos, la violencia rebelde
y el compromiso huichol para preservar su autonomía comunal, minaron las alianzas
entre los dirigentes huicholes y los funcionarios federales, lo que ultimadamente llevó
al fracaso del proyecto gubernamental. Como ninguna otra situación, el programa edu-
cativo revolucionario de corta vida equipó a toda una nueva generación de líderes huic-
holes con herramientas para resistir mejor las presiones asimilacionistas externas de los
años  y después.
Spanish keywords: huicholes, revolución mexicana, construcción estatal, educación,
rebelión cristera, asimilación
Portuguese abstract. Tentativas de utilizar escolas para assimilar Huichóis ao Estado-
nação revolucionário levaram ao desenvolvimento de parcerias divergentes e
conﬂitos em sua patria chica, envolvendo comunidades e facções Huichóis rivais,
mestiços locais, funcionários do governo e rebeldes cristeros. As provocações de profes-
sores, a avareza de caciques mestiços, a violência de rebeldes, e o comprometimento
Huichól em preservar a autonomia comunal minaram as alianças entre líderes
Huichóis e funcionários federais, levando, ultimamente, ao fracasso do projeto gov-
ernamental. Se de fato algum resultado foi alcançado pelo programa de educação
revolucionário de curta existência, este foi, na verdade, equipar uma nova geração de
líderes Huichóis com ferramentas para melhor resistir às pressões assimilacionistas
externas durante a década de  e décadas subsequentes.
Portuguese keywords: Huichóis, revolução Mexicana, construção de Estado, educação,
guerra Cristera, assimilação
 Torres Contreras, Relaciones de frontera, pp. –; interview with Antonio Candelario
(see note ).
‘Civilising the Savage’
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